How Do Online Conflict Disclosures Support Enforcement? Evidence from Personal Financial Disclosures and Public Corruption
研究美国在线公开官员个人财务披露是否及如何帮助反腐败执法，发现其通过降低执法者获取信息的成本，提高了案件举报率和起诉可能性。
ABSTRACT Public corruption is a concern for democracies around the world. In the U.S., states have responded to this issue by publishing personal financial disclosures (PFDs) for public officials online. PFDs are a conflict-of-interest disclosure designed to relieve agency conflicts between private citizens and government officials by documenting overlaps between officials’ financial interests and public responsibilities. This paper explores whether and how online PFD supports anticorruption enforcement. I present a stylized model illustrating how online PFD leads investigators to increase case referral volume and quality. Empirically, I find that online PFD for local officials is associated with increased referral rates and greater likelihoods of prosecution conditional on referral. I conduct 126 field interviews of federal prosecutors, journalists, and ethics commissions to understand the mechanisms behind these results. I conclude that online PFD supports the enforcement of local corruption by reducing disclosure acquisition costs for enforcement agents.