Manipulative overconfidence and the cost of unbiased reporting
在委托代理模型中，代理人对其盈余管理能力过度自信，委托人可通过沟通促使代理人如实报告；过度自信会增加盈余管理和激励薪酬，但沟通能抑制盈余管理，不过当过度自信严重时沟通失效，盈余管理激增。
I study earnings management in a principal-agent model where the agent is overconfident in their ability to manage earnings, and the principal may induce the agent to communicate earnings truthfully. Without communication, overconfidence causes an increase in earnings management and incentive pay and may lead to a Pareto decrease in social welfare. Through communication, the principal can deter earnings management, and overconfidence increases the agent's total compensation at the expense of firm value. When the agent becomes significantly overconfident, communication loses value, and this causes a spike in earnings management.