Financial contagion and financial lockdowns
研究极端金融冲击下，当企业财务脆弱且政策机构失灵时，强制关闭或全面金融封锁能阻止传染并改善社会福利，但仅适用于冲击严重但不广泛的情况。
Extreme financial shocks often elicit extraordinary policy interventions that preclude financial activity on a large scale, for example as the 1933 U.S. “bank holiday.” We study these interventions using a random matching framework where the financial contagion process is explicit and the diffusion of the initial shock can be analytically characterized. The study suggests that there is scope for forced closures of individual firms or even economy-wide financial lockdowns only when firms are financially vulnerable and policy institutions are not well-functioning. Here, ordinary policy alone cannot prevent or sufficiently mitigate contagion, while complementing it with a lockdown or individual closures can do so, and improve social welfare if the initial shock is severe but not widespread.