Minimum wages, wage dispersion and financial constraints in firms
利用德国雇主-雇员数据和公司资产负债表，研究了融资约束如何影响最低工资对工资分布的作用，发现融资约束企业内工资离散性随最低工资上升下降更多。
This paper studies how minimum wages affect the wage distribution if firms face financial constraints. Using German employer-employee data and firm balance sheets, we document that the within-firm wage dispersion decreases more with higher minimum wages when firms are financially constrained. We introduce financial frictions into a search and matching labor market model with stochastic job matching, imperfect information, and endogenous effort. In line with the empirical literature, the model predicts that a higher minimum wage reduces hirings and separations. Firms become more selective such that their employment and wage dispersion fall. If effort increases strongly, firms may increase employment at the expense of higher wage dispersion. Financially constrained firms are more selective and reward effort less. As a result, within-firm wage dispersion and employment in these firms fall more with the minimum wage.