Hostile activism: Hostile tactics or hostile hedge funds?
研究发现，采取敌意策略的对冲基金在后续非敌意行动中平均获得3%的更高累计异常回报，且声誉越高，回报越大；这些基金还会调整策略，针对类似敌意的目标但避免使用明确敌意手段。
Abstract In this article, we examine reputation building by activist hedge funds and provide two new findings regarding hostile activism. First, we find evidence of a permanent reputation effect to hostile activism. Activist hedge funds that have engaged in hostile tactics receive on average a 3% higher cumulative abnormal return (CAR) [−10, +10] on their subsequent nonhostile campaigns compared to hedge funds that have not engaged in hostile tactics. This abnormal return is positively related to the level of the hostile reputation of the activist hedge fund. Second, we find that activist hedge funds with higher hostile reputations modify their nonhostile activism style to engage hostile‐like targets and pursue hostile‐like objectives but withhold the use of explicitly hostile tactics. These findings imply that (1) hedge funds can build a hostile reputation using their past engagement tactics and (2) market participants perceive and value such reputation as evidenced by the higher announcement return observed in subsequent targets.