Agency in Hierarchies: Middle Managers and Performance Evaluations
研究在委托人-管理者-工人层级中，如何最优设计激励和绩效评级量表，发现二元评级量表足以实现最优，并识别主观评估有价值或无效、降低透明度有利以及强制排名优于个人评估的情形。
Abstract This paper studies the optimal joint design of incentives and performance rating scales in a principal-manager-worker hierarchy. The principal wants to motivate the worker to exert unobservable effort at the minimum feasible cost. Given the worker’s effort, two signals are realized: public and verifiable output and a private non-verifiable signal known only to the manager. The principal may try to elicit the manager’s private information by requiring her to evaluate the worker’s performance. Payments may depend on output and the manager’s evaluation. I show that the principal can achieve no more than what is feasible with a binary rating scale. I also identify scenarios where subjective evaluations are valuable (non-valuable), reduced transparency is advantageous, and forced ranking outperforms individual evaluations.