社会商议与判断聚合的相互依赖

The interdependence of social deliberation and judgment aggregation

Social Choice and Welfare · 2024
被引 0
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

论证社会商议设计的认识论合理性取决于后续采用的判断聚合规则,反之亦然,并通过两个模型展示了个体能力提升与集体能力下降的悲剧性现象。

Abstract

Abstract Imagine that the judgments of some individuals on some issues are aggregated into collective judgments. Social deliberation about the issues prior to aggregation can lead to improved judgments, at both the individual and the collective level. In this paper I argue that the epistemic justification for a social deliberation design depends on the chosen judgment aggregation rule, and vice versa . This claim consists of two parts. First, the epistemic superiority of one deliberation design over another or over the absence of any deliberation depends on which procedure is subsequently used to aggregate individual judgments. Second, the epistemic superiority of one aggregation procedure over another depends on how the preceding social deliberation was designed. In short, the choice of deliberation design and of aggregation rule are intertwined. This claim is substantiated by two models. Both models display a tragic rise in competence: social deliberation raises individual competence while reducing collective competence. Here, individual and social epistemology come interestingly apart.

社会审议判断聚合认知正当性能力悖论