欧盟2014年与2022年对俄罗斯的自主制裁:官僚政治模型如何引入欧盟内部的制度‘权力平衡’?

The EU's Autonomous Sanctions Against Russia in 2014 Versus 2022: How Does the Bureaucratic Politics Model Bring in the Institutional ‘Balance of Power’ Within the EU?

Journal of Common Market Studies · 2024
被引 8
ABS 3

中文导读

比较欧盟2014年与2022年对俄制裁差异,指出欧盟委员会态度转变和内部权力平衡变化是关键因素,并扩展了官僚政治模型的分析范围。

Abstract

Abstract The European Union (EU) has been more incensed over Russian aggression towards Ukraine in 2022, when compared to Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014. This article questions this shift by looking at the EU's sanctions towards Russia. It argues that the relative unwillingness of the European Commission, and accordingly the imbalance or lopsided distribution of power within and amongst the relevant EU institutions, was one of the factors internal to the EU that prevented an effective response in 2014. Although external and contextual factors have been crucial, the EU has adopted harsher sanctions against Russia since 2022 because the Commission is not unwilling to act as it was in 2014, and dissenting members have found it difficult to obstruct the process in the Council of the EU. This article also extends the analytical repertoire of the bureaucratic politics model by demonstrating that it retains explanatory power even when the traditional parameters remain constant over time.

欧盟政治国际制裁官僚政治俄罗斯与乌克兰冲突