MNCs’ Intermediate Units and Their Choice of Control Mechanisms
研究跨国公司中间单位（对下属子公司行使权力的部门）如何选择集权、正式化、结果控制和社会化等控制机制，结合代理与网络理论分析其双重代理角色和网络嵌入性的影响，基于欧洲跨国公司旗下西班牙中间单位对拉美子公司的管理数据。
Abstract This paper analyzes how MNCs’ intermediate units—those that exercise authority over other subsidiaries—apply specific control mechanisms: centralization, formalization, outcome control, and socialization. We combine agency and network theory to explain how intermediate units’ dual agency role—as both principal and agent— and their network embeddedness form the choice of control mechanisms. More specifically, we propose hypotheses on how the intermediate units’ internal and external relationships determine their choice of control mechanism. We study this issue in the context of Spanish intermediate units —owned by European MNCs— that exercise authority over subsidiaries in Latin America.