双重持有者的权衡理论

Trade‐Off Theory for Dual Holders

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · 2024
被引 2
人大 A-ABS 4

中文导读

研究了同时持有同一公司私债和股权的双重持有者如何影响债务的税收优势、违约风险和外部债务成本,发现企业应发行优先外部债务和次级私债。

Abstract

Abstract A dual holder simultaneously owns (private) debt and equity in the same firm. Private debt has a tax advantage, a positive cashflow, which incentivizes its use. This cashflow leads to a lower net cost of debt, which again reduces default risk as well as the cost of external debt. The usual trade‐off between tax benefits and bankruptcy costs is altered. Debt priority affects both financing and default decisions. We find that an enterprise‐value maximizing firm should issue senior, external debt and junior, private debt, rather than debt with pari‐passu priority. Our analysis further highlights that tax authorities can effectively curtail the tax‐motivated use of private debt through straightforward measures.

双重持有人资本结构权衡理论债务优先级私人债务税收优势