Transportation networks and competition in the market for corporate control
研究了航空线路是否加剧公司控制权市场的竞争，发现目标公司与潜在收购方之间更短的飞行时间能提高目标公司收益和竞标数量，但对收购方讨价还价能力无显著影响。
Abstract Research Summary While competition in the market for corporate control determines firms' ability to capture value from acquisitions, there is limited evidence of factors that influence such competition. This study explores whether airline routes intensify competition in this market and affect the target's returns. Targets can become better connected to distant latent acquirers (DLAs), which can increase the targets' bargaining power. Similarly, better connectivity can allow acquirers to reach distant latent targets (DLTs) and therefore increase the acquirers' bargaining power. Examining acquisitions between US public companies during 1980–2018, I find that lower travel time between the target and its DLAs increases the target's returns and the number of competing bids. Instead, the travel time between the acquirer and its DLTs does not play a role. Managerial Summary In corporate acquisitions, the competitive threat posed by potential alternative acquirers of the target generally forces the focal acquirer to offer high returns to the target to gain its control. Indeed, these transactions are often not profitable for acquirers. Yet, we know little about what determines the competitive threat faced by acquirers in the market for corporate control. This study shows that the presence of airline routes that reduce the travel time between the target and its latent acquirers increases the target's returns from the deal and the number of competing bids. The study also tests whether lower travel time between the acquirer and its latent targets gives the acquirer more bargaining power vis‐à‐vis the focal target. However, there is no evidence of this effect.