Effects of patent privateering on settlements and R&D under sequential market entry
研究了两家企业在序贯进入市场时，专利私掠（将专利卖给专利主张实体）如何影响专利诉讼、和解及研发激励，发现序贯进入可缓解私掠效应，且私掠可能扭曲研发激励、降低行业利润。
We investigate patent litigation, settlements and R&D incentives on a market where two firms develop technologies in order to obtain patents and produce goods. Firms may sell IP rights to a Patent Assertion Entity (PAE) that acts as intermediary for patent monetization. We find that compared to simultaneous market entry, the effect of this so-called patent privateering is mitigated if firms enter sequentially. Furthermore, we show that privateering may decrease industry profits by distortion of R&D incentives even when there is no rent extraction by the PAE.