Organizing for Collective Action: Olson Revisited
研究了在私人信息下集体行动问题的最优诚实服从机制，发现基于志愿者的组织在大群体中近似最优，且能显著提升成功概率。
We characterize optimal honest and obedient (HO) mechanisms for the classic collective action problem with private information, where group success requires costly participation by some fraction of its members. For large n, a simple HO mechanism, the volunteer-based organization, is approximately optimal. Success is achieved in the limit with probability one or zero depending on the rate at which the required fraction declines with n. For finite n, optimal HO mechanisms provide substantial gains over unorganized groups when the success probability converges to zero, because the optimal HO success probability converges slowly and is always positive, while finite-sized unorganized groups have exactly zero probability of success.