The Dynamics of Instability
研究两个利益对立的玩家如何通过制造不稳定来改变现状，发现不稳定虽无短期收益但能带来长期持久变化，且最终稳定状态往往对初始劣势方不利。
We study a model in which two players with opposing interests try to alter a status quo through instability‐generating actions. We show that instability can be used to secure longer‐term durable changes, even if it is costly to generate and does not generate short‐term gains. In equilibrium, instability generated by a player decreases when the status quo favors them more. Equilibrium always exhibits a region of stable states in which the status quo persists. As players' threat power increases, this region shrinks, ultimately collapsing to a single stable state that is supported via a deterrence mechanism. There is long‐run path‐dependency and inequity: although instability eventually leads to a stable state, it typically selects the least favorable one for the initially disadvantaged player.