Worst‐case equilibria in first‐price auctions
研究了竞拍者不知道对手估值精确分布、只知道均值时的第一价格拍卖，提出了基于最坏情况推理的均衡概念，并找到了一个唯一且有效的均衡。
The usual analysis of bidding in first‐price auctions assumes that bidders know the distribution of valuations. We analyze first‐price auctions in which bidders do not know the precise distribution of their competitors' valuations, but only the mean of the distribution. We propose a novel equilibrium solution concept based on worst‐case reasoning. We find an essentially unique and efficient worst‐case equilibrium of the first‐price auction that has appealing properties from both the bidders' and the seller's point of view.