Voluntary disclosures regarding open market repurchase programs
研究公司自愿披露暂停、恢复或完成公开市场回购计划的行为，发现这些披露常见且影响后续回购活动，自愿披露坏消息的公司能建立透明声誉并获得市场奖励。
Abstract This paper studies voluntary disclosures that firms have suspended, resumed, or completed their open market repurchase programs. Voluntary disclosures of repurchase status updates are common and value‐relevant. They also inform subsequent repurchase activities: voluntary disclosers are more likely to complete their repurchase programs and to initiate new repurchase programs than firms with undisclosed repurchase status changes. Moreover, firms that disclose repurchase suspensions experience larger returns to subsequent repurchase authorizations, consistent with a reward for establishing a reputation for transparency via voluntary bad news disclosure. Finally, exploiting a change in repurchase reporting requirements, we document that voluntary updates are less frequent when mandatory disclosure increases. An important exception, however, is when macroeconomic uncertainty is high, such as during the Great Recession and the COVID‐19 pandemic.