Mechanisms and axiomatics for division problems with single-dipped preferences
研究在代理人具有单峰偏好时，如何分配一种无限可分的商品，分析了纳什均衡、帕累托最优纳什均衡和强均衡，并给出了公理化刻画。
Abstract A mechanism allocates one unit of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents reporting a number between zero and one. Nash, Pareto optimal Nash, and strong equilibria are analyzed for the case where the agents have single-dipped preferences. One main result is that when the mechanism satisfies anonymity, monotonicity, the zero–one property, and order preservation, then the Pareto optimal Nash and strong equilibria coincide and result in Pareto optimal allocations that are characterized by so-called maximal coalitions: members of a maximal coalition prefer an equal coalition share over obtaining zero, whereas the outside agents prefer zero over obtaining an equal share from joining the coalition. A second main result is an axiomatic characterization of the associated social choice correspondence as the maximal correspondence satisfying minimal envy Pareto optimality, equal division lower bound, and sharing index order preservation.