定价格式的选择:企业可能选择统一定价而非个性化定价以诱导竞争对手缓和竞争

The choice of pricing format: Firms may choose uniform pricing over personalized pricing to induce rivals to soften competition

Information Economics and Policy · 2024
被引 7
人大 A-ABS 2

中文导读

研究了企业为何可能放弃个性化定价而选择统一定价,因为个性化定价会消除竞争对手通过非价格变量(如水平差异化)缓和竞争、提高利润的可能性,从而可能使统一定价成为占优策略。

Abstract

Technological development and better information systems potentially increase firms' abilities to use personalized pricing. Should firms take advantage of such an opportunity, or should they rather charge all consumers the same price (uniform pricing)? It might seem obvious that it is optimal for an individual firm to use personalized pricing; if it does, it can charge each consumer a price equal to her maximal willingness to pay. No other price plan can possibly yield higher profits. However, we show that if a firm is expected to use personalized pricing, then it effectively eliminates a rival's possibility to select values on non-price variables, such as horizontal differentiation, that can soften competition and increase profits for all firms. Once we take this into account, we might no longer expect that personalized pricing is a dominant strategy. Indeed, we show that it may be a dominant strategy for a firm to commit to uniform pricing prior to the rival's choice of non-price variables if it has the ability to do so.

定价策略个性化定价统一定价竞争缓和