Understanding the German criticism of Target
研究德国学者对欧元区Target支付系统不平衡的批评，认为其并非毫无根据，并指出问题根源在于欧元区内各国央行的并存。
Abstract Does the accumulation of large Target imbalances threaten the viability of the monetary union? Several German and central European scholars have responded in the affirmative: in the case of a disorderly break-up, debtor countries might have an incentive to default on their Target balances, and this would represent a real loss to Target creditors. Most academics have rejected this argument: in their view, a Target default would be only a paper loss to creditors. I propose a simple and unified framework to study the working of the Target system in response to different shocks. I then argue that the German criticism of the Target system is not so unfounded after all, and should be taken seriously. The underlying problem is the co-existence of separate central banks within the Eurozone; if one wants to preserve this feature, no alternative to the current Target system and its problems seems to be realistically available. In particular, comparisons with the Interdistrict Settlement Account of the US Federal Reserve system are misleading.