Stability in Large Markets
研究了在匹配模型中，当存在大量代理人且偏好和网络结构任意时，成对稳定结果的存在性，并提出了树稳定性作为更合适的解概念。
Abstract In matching models, pairwise-stable outcomes do not generally exist without substantial restrictions on both preferences and the topology of the network of contracts. We address the foundations of matching markets by developing a matching model with a continuum of agents that allows for arbitrary preferences and network structures. We show that pairwise-stable outcomes are guaranteed to exist. When agents can interact with multiple other counterparties, pairwise stability is too weak of a solution concept, and we argue that a refinement of it called tree stability is the most appropriate solution concept in this setting. Our main results show that tree-stable outcomes exist for arbitrary preferences and network topologies.