Shaping Incentives through Measurement and Contracts
放宽了经典委托代理模型中关于代理人行动集、绩效测量分布和工资表形状的常见限制，求解出最优结果分布、测量方式和工资方案，为理解实际中的激励设计提供了统一框架。
ABSTRACT I study productive activity, measurement, and compensation in a principal agent model that relaxes common restrictions on the action set of the agent, the distribution of performance measures, and the shape of the wage schedule. The solution to this relaxed problem unifies insights from extant theory and shares features with well-known empirical phenomena. In particular, the optimal outcome distribution has a kink, optimal measurement is conservative, and optimal wages ensure congruent incentives and resemble accounting-based bonus plans featuring a floor, hurdle bonus, incentive zone, and ceiling, with thresholds that may reference other performance measures. Beyond these specific insights, the paper provides a flexible framework for studying how incentives are shaped through measurement and contracts.