Regulatory Stringency and Emission Leakage Mitigation
构建两国贸易模型，将排放视为生产投入并产生跨境污染，研究监管者设定排放上限的战略激励，发现更严格监管可缓解排放泄漏、减少全球污染并提升本国福利，结果取决于行业间排放强度相对大小及生产消费关系。
Abstract We construct a two-country trade model where emissions are an input in production and generate cross-border pollution. We examine the strategic incentives of an active regulator who sets a binding level of emissions in production. We show that, in the presence of terms of trade and emission leakage strategic motives, tighter regulation can mitigate emission leakage, reduce global pollution, and improve a country’s welfare. This result and the corresponding policy implications depend on the relative magnitude of emissions intensities of goods between sectors and on their relationship in production and consumption.