Strategic capital taxation, tradable emission permits and global pollution
研究了一个两国模型，分析资本税与可交易排放许可证的不同组合对减少全球污染的效果，发现特定条件下国际可交易许可证与资本税豁免或税收抵免组合能实现最低污染水平。
Abstract The paper considers a two‐country model with international capital mobility and production‐generated cross‐border pollution. It examines the effectiveness of alternative policy combinations consisting of capital taxes and nationally or internationally tradable emissions permits in reducing global pollution. The internationally mobile capital is taxed according to three different rules, namely, capital tax exemptions , capital tax credits and capital tax deductions . Our key result is that, under certain conditions, the lowest Nash equilibrium level of global pollution is achieved with a policy mix combining either capital tax exemptions or capital tax credits with internationally, rather than nationally, tradable emission permits.