Fiscal transfers and common debt in a Monetary Union: a multi-country agent–based stock flow consistent model
用多国AB-SFC模型评估将欧洲货币联盟转为政府间财政转移联盟的经济效果，发现该机制能稳定国际贸易和联盟GDP，且核心国家受益最多。
Abstract Using a refined version of our multi-country AB-SFC model of a Monetary Union the paper aims at providing a tentative assessment of the economic effects of transforming the European Monetary Union into an Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer Union (IFTU) with its own fiscal capacity. Countries contribute proportionally to their GDP, whereas funds are redistributed according to a mechanism that gives more funds to countries performing worse than the average of the Union in cyclical terms. Our simulations show that an IFTU inspired by such a redistribution principle acts as a stabilizer of international trade, allowing us to stabilize and improve the Union GDP performance without affecting the stability of public finances. When the Union is allowed to borrow on capital markets, i.e. in a Fully Fledged Fiscal Transfer Union (FFFTU), these effects are enhanced and a part of the public debt burden shifts from the national to the Union level, leaving the total burden almost stable. An interesting result to assess the political acceptability of the proposal is that “core” countries eventually benefit the most from the introduction of this mechanism, despite being more frequently net contributors. Finally, we show that an FFFTU with common debt might help to soften the impact of an exogenous demand shock, while, because of the fact that it mainly operates as a stabilizer of aggregate demand, it does not seem to provide beneficial effects when facing a supply shock to production.