The political climate trap
构建了一个政治经济模型来解释汽油税的国际差异，发现汽车保有结构导致的群体利益可以造成低税均衡，即使多数人能从高税减排中受益，仍可能陷入政治气候陷阱。
We develop a simple political-economic model of a climate trap. We apply our model to gasoline taxes, which vary dramatically across countries. Externalities cannot fully account for this. Our model shows that group interests, resulting from the composition of a country’s car fleet, can explain differences in gasoline taxes even among countries with identical fundamentals. Endogenous car ownership can yield multiple equilibria. This can lead to a political climate trap, where a low gasoline tax reflects the views of a majority, but another majority would benefit from transitioning to a high-tax equilibrium with fewer emissions.