Coordination in the Fight against Collusion
研究了反垄断执法与受害实体自行威慑合谋之间的协调问题，发现采购方可能更倾向于容忍而非威慑供应商合谋，而集中采购机构则可能有效威慑合谋。
While antitrust authorities strive to detect, prosecute, and thereby deter collusive conduct, entities harmed by that conduct are also advised to pursue their own strategies to deter collusion. The implications of such delegation of deterrence have largely been ignored, however. In a procurement context, we find that buyers may prefer to accommodate rather than deter collusion among their suppliers. We also show that a multimarket buyer, such as a centralized procurement authority, may optimally deter collusion when multiple independent buyers would not, consistent with the view that “large” buyers are less susceptible to collusion.