Mandatory Retirement for Judges Improved the Performance of US State Supreme Courts
利用美国州最高法院的改革作为自然实验，研究发现强制退休制度通过增加意见产出和引用次数提升了法院绩效，且效果超出年龄结构变化预期，部分源于选择性离职和老法官对年轻法官的负面影响。
This paper provides evidence on how mandatory retirement influences judge performance using reforms in US state supreme courts as a natural experiment. We find that introducing mandatory retirement improves court performance as measured by output (number of opinions) and legal influence (number of citations to opinions). While older judges are cited less than younger judges, the effect of mandatory retirement is larger than what is expected from a change in the age distribution. We find some evidence that the additional effect is due to selective attrition and that the presence of older judges reduces the performance of younger judges.