Avoidance and Aggression in Stakeholder Engagement: The Impact of CEO Paranoia and Paranoia-Relevant Cues
研究了CEO偏执（多疑、怨恨、不信任等稳定倾向）如何影响企业与外部利益相关者的互动，发现高偏执CEO通常回避接触，但在遭遇监管处罚或对手攻击等偏执相关线索时会转向攻击性参与。
We develop and test theory regarding the effect of CEO paranoia, defined as stable tendencies toward suspicion, feelings of ill will or resentment, mistrust, and belief in external control or influence, on firm stakeholder engagement. We theorize that because CEOs higher in paranoia have tendencies toward hypervigilance and the biases of self-as-target and sinister attributions they typically avoid engagement with external stakeholders. Further, we argue that CEOs higher in paranoia are subject to paranoid activation when confronted with trait-relevant cues that confirm suspicions of being targeted by a malevolent external entity (here, regulatory rulings or rival attacks), thus eliciting a shift away from avoidance to a more aggressive engagement with those stakeholders. To do so, we develop a content-analytic measure of CEO paranoia following both theory and evidence in psychology and methodological best practices, finding evidence that broadly supports our premise. In total, our study draws attention to how the manifestation of CEO paranoia changes the way CEOs engage stakeholders over time, contributing to understanding in multiple ways.