Cooperative Security Analysis of Industry Cloud Control Systems Under False Data Injection Attacks
研究了工业云控制系统在虚假数据注入攻击下的安全问题，提出基于冗余的传感器配置方案和基于两阶段Stackelberg博弈的防御资源分配策略，以优化有限资源下的整体防御能力。
This article analyzes a security problem for industry cloud control systems (CCSs), where a malicious false data injection (FDI) attacker may deteriorate the system performance by tampering with the data being transmitted. To improve the robustness of CCSs against FDI attacks, a redundancy-based sensor configuration scheme is provided through analysis of the observability under attacks of the nodes in CCSs. Then, a defending resource allocation scheme is developed based on a two-stage Stackelberg game in order to optimize the overall defense capability of the CCSs with limited defending resource. In this two-stage Stackelberg game, the defender of the CCSs acts first and allocates the defending resource to secure the measurements of wireless sensors. With the knowledge of the defender’s strategy, the attacker then decides which target nodes to launch attacks on. The optimal resource allocation strategy is then designed in the sense of the Stackelberg equilibrium. Furthermore, the defense problem under different attacking resource constraints is investigated. Numerical examples illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.