Failing Forward in European Economic Governance: The Cyclicality of European Integration and Institutional Competition in the COVID‐19 Crisis
本文基于专家访谈和官方文件，比较欧元危机和疫情中欧盟制度层级的变化，修正了“失败前进”理论，指出政府间决策常受特定利益主导、超国家机构可利用政府间方案合法性危机、临时措施可能延长一体化周期。
Abstract The European Union's (EU's) response to the pandemic has been accompanied by reconfigurations in its institutional hierarchy, affecting the sites where institutional reforms are prepared and implemented. Whereas the Eurogroup drove reform during the euro crisis, the Commission had a more pronounced role in the development and implementation of pandemic instruments. This article ties in with failing‐forward arguments that view European integration as cyclical, arguing that this cyclicality also concerns the institutional dynamics in European economic governance. Based on expert interviews, official documents and reports, the analysis reconstructs and compares the institutional configurations during the euro crisis and the pandemic. Its findings suggest three modifications to ‘failing forward’: first, incomplete intergovernmental decisions are often the result of dominant particular interests rather than ‘lowest common denominator’ solutions; second, supranational bodies can exploit the delegitimization of intergovernmental solutions; and third, ad hoc measures can prolong the failing‐forward cycle and displace lasting integration steps.