Credit Markets, Property Rights, and the Commons
通过动态模型和全球渔业数据，研究发现产权安全能促进资源保护，而信贷市场对资源开采的影响取决于产权是否安全：产权不安全时信贷扩张加剧开采，产权安全时则减少开采。
Credit markets and property rights are fundamental for modern economies, but their implications for the commons are unknown. Using a dynamic model of competitive resource extraction, we show that improving property right security unambiguously increases conservation incentives, but the effect of credit markets on resource extraction effort hinges on the security of property rights. We test these predictions using data on global fisheries, credit markets, and the largest ever marine property rights assignment. We find that property right security reduces resource extraction and that credit market development increases resource extraction under insecure property rights but reduces resource extraction under secure property rights.