On stakeholder theory and corporate investment under financial frictions
研究了当管理层追求利益相关者价值而非股东价值时，金融摩擦如何影响企业投资决策，发现利益相关者企业投资更多，但股权发行面临严重信息不对称或高成本时例外。
Abstract The view that corporations have a wider focus than just maximising shareholder value has received considerable attention from practitioners, managers, and academics alike. We investigate the Q theory of corporate investment with financial frictions when management maximises stakeholder value instead of shareholder value. Different objective functions are investigated. We characterise the optimal investment and financial policy of the firm. The results show that stakeholder firms invest more than shareholder firms, that is, over invest, and an increase of stakeholder shares increases investment, except when equity issuing firms face severe informational asymmetries or severe cost of external equity. We also discuss different approaches to model investment of stakeholder firms and their implications for empirical analysis.