Do Better Managers Get Better Loan Contracts?
研究了管理者能力对银行贷款合同的影响，发现能力更强的管理者能获得更低的贷款利差、更少的限制条款和更短的期限，且这一效应在信息不对称或违约风险较高的公司中更显著。
This paper examines the impact of managerial ability on bank loan contracting. We find that firms with higher‐ability managers obtain more favourable loan contract terms, including lower loan spreads, fewer covenants, and more short‐term maturities. Furthermore, the negative relation between managerial ability and loan spread is concentrated in firms with higher information asymmetry, higher default risk, or lower agency costs of debt. Finally, we find that firms with higher‐ability managers are more likely to choose public bonds over bank loans.