Do foreign institutional investors improve board monitoring?
利用2007-08年全球金融危机作为外生冲击，研究发现外国机构投资者持股增加会降低董事会规模、减少董事兼任、削弱CEO权力和薪酬，并提升董事会勤勉度，但会降低董事会独立性，最终提高企业估值和创新活动。
Exploiting the global financial crisis of 2007–08 as an exogenous shock that resulted in a significant decline in the ownership of foreign institutional investors (FIIs) in the Indian equity market, we find evidence of a causal link between FIIs’ ownership and different dimensions of board monitoring. Specifically, the empirical results suggest that higher FIIs ownership leads to lower board size, busyness, network size, CEO power, CEO pay, and improved board diligence. However, we also document a negative link between FIIs’ ownership and board independence, indicating that FIIs do not view independent directors as effective monitors. In terms of implications, our results suggest that improved board monitoring, induced by higher FIIs’ ownership, leads to higher firm valuation and innovation activities.