The Effects of Regulatory Office Closures on Bank Behavior
研究发现，监管办公室关闭后，受影响的银行增加贷款和风险承担，导致2008-09年金融危机期间贷款损失更大、失败率更高。地理邻近性有助于减少监管信息摩擦，促进银行稳定。
Abstract We investigate if the decentralized structure of regulatory office networks influences supervisory outcomes and bank behavior. Following the closure of an office, banks previously supervised by that office increase their lending and risk‐taking. As a result, affected banks have larger loan losses and higher failure rates during the 2008–09 financial crisis. Analysis of the channels suggests that proximate supervisors enforce timelier provisioning practices, restrict large cash payouts, and provide advice that increases a bank's risk‐adjusted returns. Overall, our findings imply that geographical proximity reduces informational frictions in supervisory monitoring and leads to more stable banks.