Territory in the state of nature
研究了资源分布不均如何影响个体在冲突环境中的领地选择，通过经济模型和实验室实验发现，行为接近理论预测，且资源对称时强者选择更排他的领地，资源倾斜时弱者选择更被包围的领地。
In this paper we examine territorial behavior in the ecological conditions that foster conflict. We develop an economic model that isolates the effects of resource skew on territorial ranges, as well as their interactions with unequal appropriation abilities. We then conduct a controlled laboratory experiment to test the predictions of our model and find that observed behavior tends to cluster around the equilibrium predictions and that all comparative statics have the predicted sign. Additionally, we find that equally strong appropriators select more exclusive and less overlapping ranges than what is predicted with symmetric resources, while weaker appropriators choose more engulfed ranges than what is predicted with skewed resources.