Consumer data and price discrimination by consideration sets
研究了同质产品寡头市场中，零售商利用消费者购买历史数据，根据其考虑模式进行两期差别定价，导致市场完全细分，并分析了均衡价格、利润和消费者剩余的变化。
In a homogeneous product oligopoly with probabilistic consideration, identical retailers compete in prices over two periods. In period two, purchase history data enables price discrimination based on consumers’ consideration patterns. Retailers discriminate by conditioning prices on a consumer’s period one supplier. Endogenously acquired consumer information is asymmetric across firms. Price discrimination underpins complete market segmentation. Sub-markets differ in market structure and competitive pressure. In unique symmetric sequential equilibrium, retailers fine-tune period two prices in response to competitive pressure and, compared to uniform pricing, charge (on average) higher period one prices and make larger expected profits, associated with lower expected consumer surplus.