Incentive Auction Design Alternatives: A Simulation Study
通过大规模计算模拟，研究了美国联邦通信委员会2016-2017年激励拍卖中使用的降序时钟反向拍卖设计的定量影响，对拍卖设计者和政策制定者有参考价值。
This paper revisits the descending clock “reverse” auction design used in the U.S. Federal Communications Commission’s 2016–2017 “incentive auction.” We use extensive computational simulations to investigate the quantitative significance of various aspects of the design, leveraging a reverse auction simulator and realistic models of bidder values. This paper was accepted by Gabriel Weintraub, revenue management and market analytics. Funding: This work was supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency [Grant FA8750-19-2-0222 CFDA\# 12.910], the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research [Canada AI Research Chair at the Alberta Machine In], the National Science Foundation [Grant 1525730], and the Canadian Network for Research and Innovation in Machining Technology, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada [Discovery Grant, Discovery Grant Supplement]. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.02489 .