肾脏交换中的冲突目标

Conflicting objectives in kidney exchange

Journal of Economic Theory · 2024
被引 5
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

研究了肾脏交换项目中优先考虑高度HLA致敏受者与最大化移植数量之间的权衡条件,发现允许某些循环交换和链式交换不会引入冲突,并提出一类新匹配确保帕累托有效结果。

Abstract

There is no conflict between maximizing the number of transplants and giving priority to, e.g., highly HLA-sensitized recipients in kidney exchange programs that only permit pairwise exchanges. In some programs that feature cyclic exchanges or chains, however, giving priority to some recipients may reduce the number of transplants that can be carried out. This paper identifies the conditions under which there is a trade-off between prioritization and transplant maximization objectives. The results show that kidney exchange programs can permit some cyclic exchanges and chains without introducing such trade-offs. Whether or not a kidney exchange program has conflicting objectives and regardless of how recipients are prioritized, it can ensure a Pareto efficient outcome by selecting from a new class of matchings. These generalize several classes of matchings used in practice and studied in the literature.

肾脏交换目标冲突优先权帕累托有效匹配