Who Pays a Visit to Brussels? Firm Value Effects of Cross-Border Political Access to European Commissioners
研究美国公司与欧盟公司接触欧盟委员会专员的不同价值效应，发现美国公司通过会面获得更有利的并购决策，从而提升企业价值。
Abstract This study analyzes meetings of firms with policymakers at the European Commission (EC). Meetings with Commissioners are associated with positive abnormal equity returns for U.S. firms. Firms of the European Union (EU), however, do not experience significant value increases. We identify regulatory outcomes as a channel that can rationalize this difference in value effects of political access. U.S. firms with meetings are more likely to receive favorable decisions in their EC merger decisions than their EU peers. The results suggest that cross-border political access can alleviate uncertainties and alleged discriminatory behavior of regulators in foreign markets.