Strategic communication in committees with expressive payoffs
研究了委员会成员因个人投票决策被问责时，多数投票制下表达性收益导致搭便车问题，阻碍真实沟通和最优决策；而一致同意制能缓解此问题，实验证实一致同意下更诚实且更可能做出最优决策。
Abstract This article explores information aggregation and strategic communication in settings where committee members are held accountable, formally or informally, for their individual voting decisions. We show that if decisions are made via majority voting, expressive payoffs introduce a free‐rider problem that prevents the committee from communicating truthfully and taking optimal decisions. In contrast, if decisions are made by unanimity, free‐riding is mitigated because all agents are responsible for the committee's decision. In a controlled laboratory experiment, we find that under unanimity subjects are more truthful and are ultimately more likely to take the optimal decision.