The Equilibrium Size and Value‐Added of Venture Capital
建立模型研究创业者在风险投资高增值与低增值两个市场间的正向分类，发现过多风投承诺提供高增值并组建小规模投资组合，导致低增值市场匹配质量下降，整体投资不足，并解释了风投回报与增值在募资浪潮中的变化。
ABSTRACT I model positive sorting of entrepreneurs across the high and low value‐added segments of the venture capital market. Aiming to attract high‐quality entrepreneurs, inefficiently many venture capitalists (VCs) commit to provide high value‐added by forming small portfolios. This draws the marginal entrepreneur away from the low value‐added segment, reducing match quality in the high value‐added segment too. There is underinvestment. Multiple equilibria may emerge, and they differ in aggregate investment. The model rationalizes evidence on VC returns and value‐added along fundraising “waves” and when the cost of entrepreneurship falls, and generates untested predictions on the size and value‐added of venture capital.