The Impact of Performance Reporting on Investment Behavior: Evidence from Disclosure Reform in the U.K.
研究英国一项要求上市公司在年报中描述运营和战略的披露规定，发现合规企业增加了无形资产投资，原因是吸引了长期投资者并降低了CEO薪酬对盈利的敏感度。
ABSTRACT I examine the real effects of a disclosure mandate that, with the aim of enhancing performance reporting, requires a subset of London Stock Exchange (LSE) firms to describe operational and strategic aspects of value creation, such as business operations and strategies, in their annual reports. Using an instrumented difference-in-differences design, I find that compliance with this initiative, evidenced by more disclosures of performance measures and commentaries relating to business operations and strategies, promotes intangible investments. My analysis of external and internal control systems suggests that enhanced performance reporting promotes investments because it attracts long-term investors and reduces CEO pay sensitivity to earnings performance. JEL Classifications: D22; D82; O30; M41.