Agency Cost and Debt Financing: Evidence From Developing Countries
研究了19个新兴市场中债务融资公告的价值效应，发现新债公告的回报与控股股东兼任管理层的持股比例正相关，且在公司治理较弱时更明显，说明债权人监督有助于缓解代理问题。
ABSTRACT In this article, we investigate the valuation effect of debt financing in the context of corporate agency problems. Utilizing debt financing announcements obtained from the news search in 19 emerging markets, we find that the announcement returns on new debts are positively associated with corporate agency costs measured by the ownership held by controlling shareholders who are affiliated with management and family members. These results are particularly strong in companies lacking other corporate governance mechanisms. We also identify that creditors’ monitoring serves as a channel for value creation by efficient investments in mergers and acquisitions. Overall, our results shed light on the disciplinary role of creditors in the emerging markets, where extreme agency problems between controlling and non‐controlling shareholders are prevalent.