KILLER ACQUISITIONS AND BEYOND: POLICY EFFECTS ON INNOVATION STRATEGIES
构建理论模型分析收购政策对在位企业和初创企业创新项目选择的影响，发现禁止收购总体上对创新有微弱负面影响，并探讨了补救措施和税收政策的效果。
Abstract This article provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start‐ups which serves as a foundation for the analysis of acquisition policy. We show that, in spite of countervailing incentives on incumbents and entrants, prohibiting acquisitions has a weakly negative overall innovation effect. We provide conditions determining the size of the effect and conditions under which it is zero. We further analyze the effects of less restrictive policies, including merger remedies and the tax treatment of acquisitions and initial public offerings. Such interventions tend to prevent acquisitions only if the entrant has sufficiently high stand‐alone profits.