CEO compensation complexity: Optimal contracts or agency problems?
基于薪酬数据构建CEO薪酬复杂性指数，检验其与公司价值、盈利能力和CEO更替-业绩敏感性的负相关关系，支持代理问题解释。
Abstract I construct a CEO pay complexity index based on grant‐level compensation data to test whether compensation complexity is consistent with optimal contracts or agency problems. Complexity may represent board efforts to contract optimally or a means by which the CEO camouflages agency issues and rent extraction. I find evidence supporting the agency view by showing how complexity is negatively related to firm value, profitability, and CEO turnover–performance sensitivity. I also examine the relation between complexity and CEO investment behavior and find mixed results. Overall, the findings relate to shareholders' dissatisfaction with the increased complexity of CEO compensation.