Sovereign Collateral
研究认为19世纪主权贷款中抵押条款的作用并非执行，而是促使借款国披露可靠的财政数据，并凸显大型律所作为金融中介和信息生产者的重要性。
Due to a dearth of data, nineteenth century lending to sovereign borrowers was a blind date. We argue this is the reason for collateral pledges found in contemporary lending covenants, which enabled not execution, but the production of reliable fiscal data. Lawyers injected collateral clauses in sovereign debt covenants to permit credible disclosure of hard-to-access tax data. The study foregrounds the importance of big law firms as financial intermediaries and information producers. It also contributes a new view on the role played by contracts in sovereign debt. “No [underwriting] firm can take precautions against the repudiation of a [sovereign] hypothecation.” —Thomas Baring, 1865