The geography of collective bargaining in French multi‐establishment companies
研究了多机构公司中集体谈判层级（工作场所或公司层面）与机构数量、空间分布和异质性的关系，发现雇主会根据地理分布策略选择谈判层级。
Abstract Despite growing interest in the firm bargaining process, little research focuses on the structure of bargaining within multi‐establishment firms. We question whether running negotiations at the workplace level and/or firm level is a strategic choice for employers. We hypothesize that the level chosen depends on the geography of the firm. Employers face a trade‐off: workplace bargaining is more efficient because it meets local conditions; yet higher level negotiations increase coordination costs for workers and weakens their bargaining power, which can benefit the employer. Using a French representative survey, we find a significant relation between the level of bargaining within a firm and the number, spatial distribution and heterogeneity of its establishments, suggesting that the structure of multi‐establishment firms can inform the level at which collective bargaining takes place.