Revisiting the Impact of Upstream Mergers with Downstream Complements and Substitutes
研究了上游供应商合并如何影响与垄断中间商的谈判价格，发现当中间商销售合并供应商以外的产品时，消费者需求关系不一定传导至上游谈判，合并可能提高价格而不需要排他或垄断行为。
Abstract I examine how upstream mergers affect negotiated prices when suppliers bargain with a monopoly intermediary selling products to final consumers. Conventional wisdom holds that such transactions lower negotiated prices when the products are complements for consumers and raise them when they are substitutes. The idea is that consumer demand relationships carry over to upstream negotiations, where mergers between complements weaken the suppliers’ bargaining leverage, while mergers between substitutes strengthen it. I challenge this view, showing that it breaks down when the intermediary sells products beyond those of the merging suppliers. In such cases, the merging suppliers’ products may act as substitutes for the intermediary even if they are complements for consumers, or as complements for the intermediary even if they are substitutes for consumers. These findings show that upstream conglomerate mergers can raise prices without foreclosure or monopolisation and help explain buyer-specific price effects resulting from such mergers.