Public Healthcare Financing during Counterinsurgency Efforts: Evidence from Colombia*
研究了哥伦比亚内战期间政府反叛乱行动如何影响地方公共医疗融资，发现反毒品行动并未显著改变中央对市级的医疗转移支付。
Abstract How do government counterinsurgency efforts affect local public health financing during civil conflicts? We investigate this question in the context of the protracted conflict in Colombia. Using data on antinarcotics operations and health transfers from the central government to municipal governments, we employ both panel estimations and an instrumental variable to address concerns of endogeneity. We first show evidence of a government discretionary power over the allocation of health transfers. We do not find evidence that counterinsurgency operations causally affect health transfers to municipalities. Our results rule out political alignment between mayors and the national governing party as an intermediary factor that could influence the flow of fiscal transfers in municipalities exposed to the conflict.